5 July 2022: Waldegrave - B

At the time of his appointment, Margaret Thatcher had written to Alf Morris with the party line of not agreeing to any out-of-court type settlement as reported in the Independent newspaper. The witness did not see this as an issue at the time, and certainly not as her way of stopping him doing something different. He said she simply would not have done that through a letter to an opposition MP or a newspaper article, but directly to him. The witness knew it was possible to argue with the then PM, although it was not a pleasant experience. She could be convinced to change her mind, especially if she had said something publicly, and if she did change her mind, she would not always have acknowledged it. In a similar way, on the matter of Ministers being campaigned to by those with issues to advocate, often if successful the campaigners would claim they had achieved it in the face of Government resistance, but the Minister might also claim the achievement after having listened to the debate on the issue. (“You spin me right round, baby …”)

Specific to the ongoing HIV Litigation, there was a seismic shift when John Major became PM. When the proposal had come in from Counsel for the haemophiliacs, Lord Waldegrave welcomed this, not least because the amount suggested, while sizeable, was seen to be possible. Another mention was made to the possibility it being being “leaked”. The witness worried that a leak could have led to a need for the sides to entrench, for the process to stagnate, which would not suit either side, hence the swift change of policy resulting in the announcements by the witness and the PM. A handwritten list of pros and cons was displayed and agreed by the witness, but nobody knew the author, even though it was sent to the Inquiry by the DH. It was obviously written on the back of another document related to the Inquiry evidence.

Lord Waldegrave said he did think at the time there was a moral responsibility on the Government. It would have been a horrible experience for those making the case to have to go to court, horrible for the Government due to the bashing they would take for being heartless, and the moral case was increasingly justified since it was not all down to the actions of a single clinician who was being negligent, but a wider matter. The witness personally spoke to the Treasury. The argument there was about financial and reputational matters. The moral case would not have counted for much from a Treasury perspective. Interestingly, there was an admission that there would not be another chance to settle the matter with such a relatively low cost to the Government. It is important to remember, the infected and affected did not then know of the discussions, hence the pressing of the plaintiff lawyers by the Government to ensure the vast majority of people accepted the settlement proposal. There was also an enlightening internal discussion about the problems of a high-profile Government U-turn in the run up to a general election when it was very possible that a higher amount would have to be paid out to make the matter go away. A reference to there being concerns over the effect of court action on doctors was recognised to be relative, internal to the DH, and certainly not as a minimisation to the suffering of patients.

On the other hand, there were still issues with not setting a precedent, but also concern by medical colleagues that a settlement would be seen as being detrimental to the professional opinions and practices of clinicians and medical experts. Again, the witness did not see this as a major concern since there was no admission of liability and no accusation of negligence. However, the fact that medical professionals even felt the need to raise the issue is illuminating of their self-preservation mindset. With reference to a figure which mentioned the number of people possibly infected which also mentions alternative treatment options, it was highlighted by the Chair calling into question the validity of the “best possible treatment” they kept sticking to. There was also some recognition that to not settle would be seen as “inhumane behaviour” by the Government and the witness did not disagree with that assessment, especially with the opportunity offered by the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ proposal which was not unachievable. The phrase suggesting a short-term strategy to “play a dead bat” was simply a cricketing analogy that sought to maintain the official Government position/line until the point of the announcement of the change; and this simply for the purposes of maintaining the Cabinet protocol of “collective responsibility”.

As the Government moved towards a settlement announcement, the list of justifications for acting seemed to grow, including it being a way of dealing with the Rosie Barnes Private Members Bill, among other things. (Isn’t it amazing how easier it is to see reasons for doing something once doing it has been accepted. Maybe this was just a case of corporate psychologically-driven subconscious confirmation bias, or maybe it is illustrative of conscious people saying anything which backs up their position.) Tony Newton, who was said to be supportive of the issue, cleared the way for these new monies to be disregarded for benefit purposes, despite the higher amount than what had been disregarded under the previous considerably smaller amounts. In effect, the previous amount given to the Macfarlane Trust of £34million (initially £20million) would be added to by approximately £42million more.

Counsel sought to explore how making the announcement might have been seen as a way to minimise the potential for infected people to advance any other possibilities they might have preferred. The witness referred back to his admiration for the lawyers involved, on both sides, in making this happen in such an agreeable way.

A hand-written note on top of an official document appeared to be an attempt by the Treasury to rebuke the DH for vexing them through their activities which were described as “no way of doing business.” Lord Waldegrave responded that it is common for people to be vexed when they are proven to be wrong.

The witness comes across as very assured and competent. Indeed, it could be said he quite unflappable, although there had so far not been any line of questioning which had been too challenging. We shall see.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

26 July 2023: Sunak - A

25 July 2023: Dunn - B

17 November 2022: Panel on finding the undiagnosed - A