21 July 2022: Reid - A

With the statesmanlikeness of an older gentlemen, in walked Lord John Reid; although when he slightly tripped on the carpet, he looked down in a steely and accusatory way which would have withered a lesser mortal had it been directed at an actual person. He nodded as if he recognised people who had come to hear an important speech he was due to give. This writer recalls how he was known as a hard-man of politics, an enforcer for Tony Blair, and a fixer of problems. Before any questions could start, he asked for the speaker volume to be turned up since he was “an old man”; which was slightly dissonant from his normal demeanour. The witnesses’ gritty West of Scotland accent had not been dulled by his years in the House of Lords. His being “Dr” John Reid was from non-medical studies (History).

As has become the norm, Counsel ran through John Reid’s political career. The too frequent switching of roles was not so welcome to him because he felt he would have preferred more time in certain roles, but whenever Tony Blair saw a problem, he seemed to be used as part of the solution. He admitted to not having any knowledge of Health matters. His reaction to Tony Blair putting him in charge as a Scot of the English Health system was more than one of surprise. The quoted reaction by Mr Reid to his Health appointment from an edition of Private Eye was not necessarily suitable to be read out but was expletively influenced by a Glaswegian background. He was appointed when Alan Milburn resigned to spend more time with his family. The PM did not see any constitutional problem with him being from Scotland (similar to the arguments among the chattering classes when Gordon Brown became Prime Minster some time later|) and Mr Blair saw the appointment as benefitting from a fresh pair of eyes because Mr Reid was a “fast learner”. 

Counsel asked about the allocation of responsibilities and the flow of information to the various levels of Ministerial responsibilities. Due to the large amount of issues being considered at any one time, only those matters the Secretary of State needed to see came to him. He commented on an inability to access colleagues to help him recall details due to the requirements of the Inquiry. Is it the case that outwith the time of actually being on the witness stand there is still a restriction on who a prospective witness could speak to?

The witnesses’ style was encapsulated in his response to inheriting a three-year waiting list problem. He decided it would be brought down to twelve weeks. This caused no small stir among all kinds of people and bodies, but he said if they would not make it happen, he would spend millions on buying operations from the private sector. They eventually, but quickly, settled between them on a target of 18 weeks.

He said there were quite a lot of opportunities to meet people and their representative groups; so long as the diary allowed. Both inside Westminster and externally, there were meetings with many people. This writer has a person experience which would call this assertion into question.

As both the Secretary of State for Scotland, and later Northern Ireland, Counsel sought the witnesses’ recollections on the level of involvement he had with Health issues. He recalled it as being minimal in those settings. In relation to being involved with the Treasury, he had a big-spending department (Health), so relied on the Treasury since it was the most powerful part of Government. The Chief Secretary was Paul Boateng and the Chancellor was Gordon Brown, both close colleagues.

Questions moved to the issue of providing financial support to people infected with viral Hepatitis, including the August 2003 announcement which led to the establishment of the Skipton Fund. This was to allow for ex-gratia payments, despite all the previous sticking to the line of not making payments. Mr Reid mentioned how he knew well the then Scottish First Minister, Jack McConnell, and the Scottish Health Minister, Malcolm Chisholm (who had previously been a MP in Westminster). The news of the Scottish plan to make payments caused a “frisson” among his officials. He was told his two Scots pals wanted to come and meet with him on the matter of financial payments for the virally infected. The Minister for Social Security was also in communication. At the time Mr Reid was described as “unsighted” on the matters. The use of the word “unilateral” to describe the plan by Mr Chisholm to announce a scheme was highlighted by the witness as typical of the suspicion between the new ability after Devolution of Scotland to act for itself. One element was that there was “a historic line” on that matter, which was to act in a unanimous way, and sometimes any change to established way of doing things was “uncomfortable” for some people. The sense was of an inevitability for England to follow the Scottish lead if they made that announcement.

Of his recollection at the time, which the witness did not see too many details of in the paperwork, was that he did not see a sufficient difference between the support being given to HIV infected people and the HCV infectees. He also did not hold firmly to the lack of Government liability position, even though there was said to be no legal case to lose. Thirdly, he felt there was no limit to the Government acting just when forced to by law. He cited the phrase, “Salus populi” (fully rendered as “Salus populi suprema lex esto” which is Latin for "The health (welfare, good, salvation, felicity) of the people should be the supreme law", ) to justify how a Government had a moral responsibility to look after its citizens who faced a particular challenge, especially if it related to an act of an arm of the State. He felt the line was wrong, and so apparently did the Scottish administration. He also knew about the concept of “ex-gratia” from his time working in the insurance industry. He even used it in his role with Defence to deal with a particular case where there needed to be no admission of liability.

He went on to describe his approach and experience of nine Ministerial roles and the necessary working style of the civil service to advise Ministers, including on consequence of their plans. But once a Minister had listened and decided, the officials got on with it. The idea of Scotland not having competence to make payments maybe because it was a social security issue was not found to be accurate thinking; much to the relief of the Minister there who might have had to foot the bill. Then there was paperwork suggesting how the officials needed to advise Mr Reid to seek to ensure a “minimalist” outcome to what Scotland did. Mr Reid rejected this, in fact, did not remember it coming to him and said it would have been against the Devolution settlement. He was happy to build the UK framework on the thinking that Scotland had already done. This was all happening within days of Mr Reid taking up office, it should be remembered.

The way things were done might have appeared he was “bouncing” the other nations into things, and maybe there was an element of that. He described it as “political handling”. He had done a deal with the Scots to follow their approach, and it was in everyone’s interest to have a UK scheme common to all. It did not stop Wales and Northern Ireland from having the option to “do their own thing”. It was done by a press release and not a Ministerial Statement to Parliament because of the time of year (Parliament was in recess). There was also a time pressure problem due to the scheduling of a Committee meeting for Mr Chisholm to appear at, with an expectation of him having something to say about the HCV infection situation.

“I had made my mind up,” said the witness and while acknowledged that might have been wrong, he did not want to wait to be convinced of something else. Something had to be done, since it was already twenty years too late. It is clear from the displayed documents that there was a flurry of exchanges on various matters such as who was going to pay for it all and what wording to use in the press release. “It was a tough fight to get there … but they had to be pushed,” summed up the witness. Since it was not part of the original plans, the Treasury had to be involved, even though they were not exposed to more outlay. He had originally thought the money should have come from the Treasury through the Reserve. That was why it was so difficult to find the money and was a limiting factor on the amounts available. So again, it was the Treasury which was the key player in stopping people getting a reasonable amount. Through the letter from Paul Boateng, the witness summed it up as them saying, “No way, José”. He quoted phrases to illustrate how it was certainly not a “love letter” from the Treasury, and it did restrict his options greatly, but his view was that the Scots were doing something which was right, and the rest of the UK should have followed that.