10 May 2022: Rejman - C
At half-time the match was going in favour of Counsel. There is no expectation of Dr Rejman coming out for the second half with anything new to offer. Jenni is dominating the game.
It appears there was nobody at a sufficiently senior level in Government who was interested enough in holding an Inquiry or similar investigation into the Contaminated Blood Scandal to cause it to be anything more than an occasional reference in an occasional meeting note or minute. As well as an Inquiry not being wanted, there was also talk of silencing the Sunday Times in relation to some aspect of the issue of viral infections caused by the NHS. Dr Rejman could not even remember what it referred to, let along whether or not he wrote it.
The CMO (Chief Medical Officer) would occasionally send out a letter, but there had to be a very good reason with sufficient gravitas for doing so. These CMO letters were infrequently used as a dissemination process. They were drafted by the division of the DH responsible for that issue, then put to the CMO to sign or reject. Dr Rejman was involved in drafting a couple of these. Ministers had to be aware of CMO letter since they were always related to high-level issues.
It appears that the DH tended to be reactive and not pro-active to things like emerging infective agents. The ultimate decision was left to a Minister, who was themselves “governed by public opinion in any particular case”. Clearly, the management of public opinion in relation to infective risks is very important, particularly if there could be serious consequences financially, reputationally, legally, or otherwise. Coronavirus/Covid-19 comes to mind as a recent example.
Back to the HIV litigation, Dr Rejman had a role in identifying expert witnesses. He asserted that the DH wanted to get a balanced view from experts. They had to be someone who would “speak well” in a public setting. Dr Rejman was also responsible for deciding what documents went to expert witnesses. Why is one of the combatants in a litigation case getting to decide who and what is presented. The challenge was recognised of finding an independent expert who was not already touched by the Contaminated Blood Scandal. Further, a memo specified the need to find an expert witness who was “supportive” of the Government’s position.
The process of obtaining expert witnesses also included Dr Rejman reviewing submitted evidence to check that it was relevant, good enough to send in, etc. Then the lawyers (we assume these are Government Lawyers) get to have their say. The level of control exerted by the Government in the appointment of expert witnesses in a case against that Government seems completely unfair, biased, conflicted, and plain wrong. Yet Prof Bloom was involved as an expert, despite what Dr Rejman had only just said. However, since Bloom was on a government or advisory committee, he was a candidate. There followed an exercise in double-speak about what counted as a government committee. They used Dr Mayne as an expert witness, yet she was a Centre Director, and as far as we know moved to Dublin to live after the Infected Blood Inquiry was announced, meaning she could not be forced to appear as a witness. Dr Rejman takes his evidence well into gobbledegook territory by suggesting Bloom and Mayne would possibly have given sufficiently different opinions. Yeah right, and Jenni would be happy to be sailed up the Clyde in a banana boat … not.
Before any expert witness report is submitted, Dr Rejman says it is checked to identify what is “helpful” and what is not, seeking changes as they see fit. As an aside, he says that criticisms by the expert witnesses you have selected are useful since they highlight what lawyers from the other side might bring up, and so prepare to rebut these.
The infamous statement of Ken Clarke in 1983 suggesting there was no “conclusive” proof of blood being a carrier agent, was noted as being “technically correct”, but it indicated “a fallacious approach to policy”. The same note acknowledged that in reality it was “sufficiently probable” of a causative link. Dr Rejman admitted the difficulty in finding experts to speak on behalf of the Government.
When asked about documents related to the HIV litigation, Dr Rejman simply went through his filing cabinet, likewise the admin people, looking for what “might be useful”. He and a colleague went through the collected papers to decide what was “relevant” and to be submitted. It turned out there was a year-long gap when nobody was in his post, and so some papers might have been lost. How convenient, some might say. Dr Rejman’s papers were not the official records of departmental business but might have included copies of some of these. The admin team held the official records and minutes; labelled, and lodged in the files. It looks like there was no written guidance on how to select relevant documents, resorting instead to hand-written notes on a list of papers. Then there was a bit of a run around about what previous filing cabinets might or might not have contained. The will to live is in danger becoming unfindable. Thank goodness its time for a break.
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