2 February 2023: Closing Statements, Jamie Dawson KC (for most Scottish people) - A

Jamie Dawson KC represents the majority of Scottish core participants who are represented by Thompsons Solicitors, including the Scottish Infected Blood Forum (SIBF) and Haemophilia Scotland (HS). He began by recognising those in attendance who have travelled to attend the Inquiry in person. It was noted that the rail strikes have limited those who could attend. As an aside, it was noted how the Contaminated Blood Scandal victims from Scotland have often faced barriers due to actions South of the border.

 

Time was taken to comment on the closing statements of the State bodies. Scathing criticism was directed at them for the overall approach of not seeking to influence the Chair in his findings. This was seen as an example of them as putting up “no defence against the indefensible”. Mr Dawson highlighted the total inadequacy of their positions as a way of properly engaging with the Inquiry and supporting the Chair in his work to interpret the evidence. There was a stark contrast in the submissions of the State bodies when compared to the infected and affected witnesses (even when that process was traumatic), and certain persons with connections to State actors who were unusually open to questioning. Many State bodies had sought to divert the attention of the Inquiry rather than face the questions posed. In many respects it may be said that the evidence of these bodies carries little weight due to the disingenuous way they have not engaged with the Inquiry’s independent and impartial search for truth, wherever the evidence may lead.

 

The infections were avoidable. The State failed to take the necessary steps to protect patients. Patients were useful to provide academic (and potentially commercially advantageous) information while the wellbeing of these patients as healthcare seekers was clearly not the priority. People were routinely tested and treated without information or consent. The resulting impacts were considerable and wide-ranging. Already vulnerable people were made more vulnerable by the subsequent actions to hide what had happened. Campaigners sacrificed their lives to fight for truth and justice. This is a truly unique tragedy given the total coordination of State actors – Government, the NHS, the police, and others – to seek to stop the failures of the statutory bodies being exposed. Meanwhile, people were left in poverty, in diminished health, in ignorance, and in isolation, in despair.

 

The focus of the closing statement was to be on Scottish matters, but there were various areas of Government activity at the UK level which also required closing statement comment. The Scottish separations in areas such as the Law and health service management were significant, and in themselves these were found to have failed the Scottish patients and citizens. There were some benefits of Scottish separation, but these were not used to protect people as they should have done. For example, there was a way of seeing locally produced blood products as “safer”, but even that somewhat limited opportunity was not maximised in Scotland. So, culpability is a feature to be directed at Scottish bodies, as well as the UK equivalents.

 

The ”hindsight” argument as put forward by various State actors is in conflict with the very purpose of them setting up a Public Inquiry. While the missing evidence is frustrating to the ends of justice, there is enough evidence to see the jigsaw picture despite the missing pieces. As such, it is entirely right to draw reasonable and far-reaching conclusions from what is available.

 

The assertions that “standards have changed” was similarly challenged. Some of these standards related to the fundamental ways of working which should have been in place even at the times past. Thus it may be that there remain questions about the application of these fundamental standards currently. While the Penrose Inquiry had different terms of reference, the evidence recorded during that exercise was not so distant at the time it was taken since many clinicians and others were still working within the NHS or other State bodies. While the Penrose conclusions did not bind the current Inquiry, the evidence and witness statements stand as further recorded evidence to be considered. The attempt by Prof Lowe to simply point to the Penrose conclusions as sufficient justification for his position was rejected.

 

Mr Dawson referred to the statistical evidence, recognising the challenges related to the Covid situation which hampered the Expert Group members in taking forward their remit. Some statistics were already usefully available. Analysis of data is featured in Mr Dawson’s final submissions. It was noted that the statistical numbers do not need to be “dehumanising” since those using the numbers to highlight the extent of the harms caused among the patient group were well aware of the individual personal experiences behind them. The ”experts” who gave evidence were not automatically “expert witnesses” for the purposes of the Inquiry (.. even if they tried to assume that pedestal role). They were experts in their field, but they were simply witnesses for the purposes of the Inquiry.

 

With this as an overall introduction to the closing statement, Mr Dawson then listed the main themes – 10 of them – which would form the rest of his presentation.

 

It was not the case of viruses like HIV coming along and surprising the medical profession. It was well known that blood was a hazardous treatment, yet it was not treated as such to the extent that other hazardous substances were when used in a medical context. Given this understanding, the lack of investment in maximising the safety of blood including by resourcing improved facilities does not make sense given the large amounts of money being spent on purchasing commercial alternatives to locally produced blood and products. Further, given that risks were already known, it is contradictory to good practice for there to have been such an emphasis on placing so much weight on more risky commercial products. Waiting to see how many AIDS cases there were before acting was automatically too late to act. It was as wrong a strategy as was sticking to the line of their being “no conclusive proof” that AIDS was transmitted by blood. The horse had bolted.

 

Mr Dawson continued to obliterate the arguments of State bodies which asserted their alleged ignorance and inability to know the future. More importantly, it demonstrated the complete inadequacy of the systems to respond since they were seen to be not competent and not swift enough. Like the more recent incidence of Covid decision-making, the various parties are already seeking to pass the blame parcel to each other. For infected blood, this should lead to not picking out a single perpetrator, but to showing the multi-agency culpability. (This writer noted the Covid reference coming from a KC who has already been included in the legal team to work on the Covid Inquiry.)

 

Medical experts were negligent in their professional duties by not raising concerns at the earlier opportunities than they did – if they ever did. There seemed to be decisions that were more influenced by convenience and cost-saving (… and either reputation building or reputation saving). The collective of not listening to the significantly qualified lone voices highlights the abdication of the duty to protect people above all. Public and privately attended large-group events were discussing the issues in detail, so it is not credible to suggest that the more limited information-sharing options of past times provided an excuse for collective ignorance or selective hearing. The risks were known and largely left to happen. This writer cannot help but ponder the extent to which the apparent non-action was a sin of omission (as in negligence), or a sin of commission (as in academic and commercial opportunism).